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Social Networks of Innovation in the European 
Periphery: Exploring Independent versus Corporate 
Patents in Spain circa 1820-1939 
Patricio Sáiz ∗ 
Abstract: »Soziale Netzwerke der Innovation in der Europäischen Peripherie. 
Erforschung unabhängiger vs. Firmenpatente in Spanien ca. 1820-1939«. There 
is a widespread idea that corporations have completely taken over invention 
and innovation processes throughout the twentieth century, thus becoming the 
main users of patent systems. However, recent studies suggest that, in spite of 
corporate expansion, independent invention is still economically significant 
nowadays, and that individuals outside the boundaries of the firm were 
actually the principal source of innovation before World War II. This article 
analyzes the history of corporate and independent patents in Spain in the 
long-term, in order to confirm that independents were also very relevant to 
promoting innovation and technology transfer in latecomers with high rates of 
technological dependence. Employing a new method of work with patent files, 
we also offer new historical evidence of the structure, effectiveness and scope 
of emerging international social networks of innovation. After introducing the 
research framework, Section Two briefly summarizes the characteristics of the 
Spanish patent system, and compares corporate and independent patents taken 
out between 1820 and 1939. Section Three studies the duration and strength 
of independent patents and the structure of the communities of innovation, 
and the conclusions make up Section Four. 
Keywords: patents, innovation, Spain. 
1.  Introduction 
According to most economic and historical literature related to invention 
activity and innovation processes, firms and corporations have become lead 
actors in technological shifts and economic development. A fairly widespread 
impression is that from the so-called ‘second industrial revolution’, beginning 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, large-scale enterprises and 
multinationals have taken over from independent inventors and individual 
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entrepreneurs as the main source of creativity and inventiveness. Progressively, 
in-house R&D laboratories replaced workshops and garrets as places of inves-
tigation, experimentation and testing. Likewise, multinationals increasingly 
gained control of patent ownership and management, taking over the exploita-
tion and commercialization of new technologies and spreading international 
technology transfer and innovations (Fisk 2009). The results were, and contin-
ue to be, technological and economic globalization. There seemed to be no 
intelligent life outside the multinational and multidivisional firms. Only some 
very powerful industrial districts, small knowledge-based enterprises and a few 
ingenious inventors might compete with those giants in certain areas from time 
to time, without calling corporate innovation into question. 
This perception arose from the writings of J. A. Schumpeter (1942), who, in 
the decade of the 1940s claimed and complained that large firms would eventu-
ally displace the entrepreneur, the hero of free capitalism and innovation, thus 
provoking unintended consequences for the entire society. Notwithstanding, 
strong economic growth and technological progress during the ‘golden age’ 
after World War II, which was especially based on the expansion of large 
American, European and Japanese corporations, set aside Schumpeter’s predic-
tions up until the international crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s (Hannah 
1976; Chandler 1977). The new corporate economy had come into existence, 
and during the 1990s the process of globalization occupied the front pages of 
both specialized newspapers and academic books, as business schools and 
economic faculties taught and reflected on the new dynamics of capitalism 
(Chandler 1990). Corporate innovation and international patenting, more and 
more complex and industrially interrelated, appears to have become the main 
engine of technological change and of the springboard of entire new scientifi-
cally-based sectors (Andersen 2001, chap. 7-8).This ‘neo-Schumpeterianism’ 
has definitively placed the corporation in the center of the map as the genuine 
object of study, eliminating any remaining independent inventors or entrepre-
neurs outside the in-house laboratories and the managerial structure. 
Thus, although there are thousands of historical and current studies focused 
on the innovation and enterprise, in any country and sector, there is a lack of 
research related to the beginning of this story; that is, the role of independent 
invention in world technological development. Only very recently some schol-
ars have begun to be concerned with and analyze the phenomenon in pioneer 
countries as to its economic and social consequences. Z. Khan and K. Sokoloff 
(2004) reflected on the significant historical contribution of great individual 
inventors to the progress of technology. Studying the US patent system be-
tween 1790 and 1930 and the education level of individual patentees, the au-
thors outline how invention rapidly turned in a ‘democratic’ activity as patent 
institutions guaranteed effective protection to anyone independently of their 
social origins or status (see also Khan 2005). N. Lamoreaux and K. Sokoloff 
(2005) have continued that work, demonstrating how the decline of independ-
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ent invention during the first half of the twentieth century was the cause of the 
decrease in total US patents per capita, as corporations progressively absorbed 
these talented individuals by means of acquiring their patent rights throughout 
long-term contracts or directly employing them in their R&D labs. From anoth-
er point of view, C. Macleod (2007) has demonstrated how independent inven-
tors were glorified in Britain before World War I as the new heroes of the 
British economic empire, something that declined during the interwar period 
onwards, precisely when corporate invention expanded and the social role of 
scientists arose.  
Finally, T. Nicholas’ insight (2010, 2011) has gone more deeply into the is-
sue, demonstrating the relevant function of independent invention in the US, 
Britain and Japan between 1880 and 1930. During that last year, approximately 
half of the patents were still granted to single applicants in each of those coun-
tries, regardless of the significant differences in the cost of the monopoly or in 
the legal requirements (prior technical exams etc.). Furthermore, by exploring 
cross-patent citations and other quality indicators, Nicholas demonstrates that 
the technical quality of independent innovation was as high as that originated 
from firm-based research in the three countries. Thus, these questions seem to 
have also captured the interest of present-day economists and business man-
agement scholars, who are increasingly focusing on independent invention and 
entrepreneurship as a source of technical and economic progress and discussing 
its actual economic significance. The conclusions of “the return to independent 
invention”, as T. Åstebro (2003) called it, are not clear yet. On the one hand, it 
certainly seems astonishing that during the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury approximately one third of all patents are still granted to individuals out-
side the boundaries of the firm in most of the developed countries (Spear 2006; 
IFIA 2006)1.On the other hand, almost all experts agree in pointing out the 
diversity of results obtained by independents, from high-relevance innovations 
to inventions that are apparently worth nothing (Åstebro 2003; Dahlin, Taylor 
and Fichman 2004; Meyer 2005). In general, individual inventors achieve less 
technological impact than corporations, except when they are very specialized, 
are users of the technology and are somehow related to the social networks of 
innovation within the sector (Lettl, Rost and von Wartburg 2009). 
In spite of these recent studies, further research on the role of independent 
invention is needed. We do not know, for instance, the extent of the contribu-
tions of individual and corporate innovation in latecomers and undeveloped 
                                                             
1  According to B. Spear, who studied completed term patents, one third of successful innova-
tions in Great Britain between 1970 and 2003 were registered by independent inventors. 
The International Federation of Inventor’s Associations (IFIA) claims that independent pa-
tentees applied for 25% to 50% of total resident patents in many countries during 2005 
(Italy, UK, France, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Belgium, Ireland or Norway). See <http://www. 
invention-ifia.ch/independent_inventors_statistics.htm>. 
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countries with high rates of technology transfer. Were independents also able to 
activate processes of diffusion and transfer outside their domestic boundaries or 
is that the business of the multinational? Were local technicians, inventors, 
introductors and entrepreneurs in the lacking countries also essential for tech-
nological change? Which were those historical social networks of innovation at 
both local and international levels, if any, and how did they work? In this arti-
cle we contribute to the topic by analyzing long-term independent invention in 
Spain, a latecomer at the European periphery. The method of analysis is also 
new. During the last ten years we carried out an enormous cataloguing task of 
each and every one of the 150,000 patents registered in Spain from 1820 to 
1939, building up a detailed database from the original files at the Spanish 
Patent and Trademarks Office (OEPM)2. Thus, we have been able to distin-
guish reliably between corporate and independent inventions and to cross-
reference that information with some innovation qualifiers such as the patent 
extension, obligatory working clauses, monopoly assignments, or with the 
professions of independents. 
Our findings suggest, first, that independent innovation was also very rele-
vant in latecomers and requires further research. Independents completely 
dominated the registration of patents in Spain before 1880 and they were still 
involved in more than half of the applications in the 1930s. This was particular-
ly striking among residents, where independents largely outnumbered local 
firms even up until the first third of the twentieth century, although when patent 
length and implementation are analyzed, domestic firms demonstrated more 
effectiveness than domestic individuals. Secondly, the study suggests that non-
resident independents and corporations from leader countries also had a signifi-
cant and effective role in technology transfer to Spain, which confirms the 
independents’ technical capacities in advanced economies. Finally, the analysis 
demonstrates that early international social networks of innovation were devel-
oped, linking pioneering engineers and technicians with domestic entrepreneurs 
and industrialists at the periphery.  
2.  Independent and Corporate Patenting in Spain 
From the beginning, as seen in 1811, 1820 and 1826, the Spanish patent system 
was conceived in a rather hybrid manner. The legislation assured a basic nor-
mative framework in order to protect national invention activity as well as to 
attract foreign investors and entrepreneurs, individuals or firms, who wanted to 
                                                             
2  See <http://historico.oepm.es> for further information. More than 70 people (graduated 
students, scholars and technicians) have been involved in the Collaboration Agreement be-
tween the OEPM and the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM) for cataloguing and 
studying the historical patent and trademark files. 
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extend their rights in Spain, but limiting that protection if it did not turn into 
actual innovation and industrial growth within the borders. This was imple-
mented by two major means: regulating patents of introduction and, at the same 
time, establishing compulsory working clauses. The former could be used to 
protect foreign third-person technologies without their authorization in order to 
implement them locally, providing they were not already established in Spain. 
The latter required nationals and foreigners to put into practice, within national 
territory and over a period of one, two or three years, depending on the law, the 
inventions granted by any patent, otherwise declaring an expiration date and 
therefore making that technical knowledge public and of free usage. Although 
many countries used similar strategies during the nineteenth century, most 
abandoned them as they reached technological competence and international 
competitiveness. In Spain those characteristics remained until 1986, upon join-
ing the European Union, and if we add the traditional judiciary weakness in 
prosecuting fraud against industrial property3, it seems that the Spanish patent 
system has been rather weak until recent times. This was compatible with in-
ternational agreements for the protection of industrial property, signed from 
1883-1884 on, as Spain guaranteed the same treatment to foreign and domestic 
resident patentees, being six months before 1900, and one year of priority 
rights after that date4. 
Non-resident patentees have always had a strong presence in the Spanish in-
novation system, representing approximately 50% of the total patents in the 
second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, more 
than 70% after 1960, and more than 90% after entering the European Union in 
1986, when the European Patent applications with reference to Spain went into 
effect (Sáiz 2005). Indeed, the presence of foreign technology in the patent 
system has been higher than the previous percentages, as many residents ap-
plied for ‘patents of introduction’ just to bring unimplemented technologies 
from abroad (that is, in order to manufacture them within Spain, as this kind of 
patent cannot block importations). If we add non-resident applications to resi-
dent patents of introduction, we obtain a figure of 65 and 70% of foreign tech-
nology presence between 1820 to 1939 (see Sáiz 2002, sec. 3). Thus, Spain has 
always experienced a considerable technological dependence and very high 
rates of technology transfer from abroad.  
It is well known that during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries patent 
systems everywhere went through a progressive shift from being mainly used 
by independent inventors, skilled artisans, small-scale industrialists and entre-
                                                             
3  The first courts specialized in and focused on mercantile issues, including patents, trade-
marks and industrial design, do not come into operation in Spain until 2004 (Organic Law 
8/2003, of the 9th of July). 
4  Further information on the historical characteristics, origins and evolution of the Spanish 
patent system can be found in Sáiz (2002). 
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preneurs themselves to being increasingly acquired by firms and corporations. 
By the second half of the twentieth century the vast majority of patents and 
new technologies protected in western economies were already owned by 
firms, which then employed inventors and scientists in their research depart-
ments. Apparently, the period between 1880 and 1939 was crucial in reversing 
patent ownership, especially in countries such as the US, Germany, the UK or 
France (Inkster 1991, 160-6; Cantwell and Andersen 1996; Andersen 2001, 28-
34). Eventually, lagging economies followed the same pattern, as this first 
technological globalization took place and corporations from the North Atlantic 
extended their influence. Indeed, that seems the case of Spain, in which firms 
progressively increased their presence after 1875-80 and mainly during the 
final years of the nineteenth century and the 1920s, which was a decade of 
exacerbated protectionism and heavy industrialization under Primo de Rivera’s 
dictatorship, when many foreign corporations arrived in Spain. Notwithstand-
ing, inconsistent with that view is that approximately 50% of the patents were 
still granted to independent inventors in pioneer countries throughout the dec-
ade of the 1930s (Nicholas 2010, 57-8, 2011, 997) as also occurred in Spain 
and more than likely in other economies, which means that the predominant 
historiography has neglected half of this story. 
Graph 1: Independent and Corporate Patents in Spain, 1820-1939 
 
Source: Archivo Histórico Nacional y Gaceta de Madrid between 1820 and 1826. From 1826 to 
1939: Original patent files at the OEPM. Independents: Patents applied for by one or more 
individuals; Firms: Patents applied for by firms alone or together with other individuals. 
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Table 1: Percentages of Independent and Corporate Patents. Spain, 1880-1939 
 Individuals, % Firms, % Patents, n. 
1820-1849 90.8  9.2     834 
1850-1879 91.5  8.5   5,041 
1880-1889 88.8 11.2   9,681 
1890-1899 83.9 16.1 14,913 
1900-1909 78.0 22.0 21,811 
1910-1919 74.4 25.6 24,965 
1920-1929 64.5 35.5 44,338 
1930-1939 58.3 41.7 31,284 
Source: See Graph 1. 
 
Graph 1 establishes the long-term evolution of patents applied for by independ-
ents and firms in Spain. The corporations’ catching-up process is noteworthy, 
particularly after the 1880s, which has mainly attracted the interest of research 
scholars, but firms never outnumbered total independent patents. From 1880 to 
1930, the Spanish economy improved and expanded under intense protection-
ism and governmental support for ‘national’ industrial production, meaning 
domestic and especially foreign firms installing factories within national terri-
tory. Spain strongly benefitted from World War I, first because of the increase 
in value of direct industrial and services exports during the conflict, which 
yielded enormous profits for firms and entrepreneurs, secondly because of the 
import-substitution phenomena in times of war, and finally because Spain’s 
neutrality also attracted capital, bank branches, firms and skilled human capital 
from abroad. These foreign investments, together with national accumulated 
capital, would play a significant economic role in the industrial expansion 
(especially of heavy industry) of the 1920s, the decade in which corporate 
patents rapidly increased. 
However, the unforeseen and neglected side of the coin is that individual pa-
tentees always stood out during the entire period studied. Independents com-
pletely predominated before 1880, with an average of 90.1% patents, compared 
to only 9.9% applied for by firms, the majority of the latter being small family 
companies with limited partners and only a few eventually being incorporated 
(see Sáiz 1999, 163-9). Thus, most of the nineteenth-century innovation busi-
nesses-based less on domestic invention activity than on foreign technology 
transfer-related to the first Spanish industrialization and modernization process 
were mainly developed by independents. Furthermore, albeit their proportion 
constantly decreased from 1890 to World War I and during the 1920s, it still 
remains true that independents applied for the majority of patents before World 
War II (see Table 1). As we already know, the same phenomenon was occur-
ring in the US, UK and Japan, and more than likely in other countries. We 
would certainly not be mistaken if we point out that even during the second 
industrial revolution, among the ‘visible hand’ and the research labs, an enor-
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mous share of the innovation processes were still achieved in small workshops 
and in-house basements. 
Although the general trends of the Spanish patent system have been widely 
analyzed in previous studies (Sáiz 2002), it is necessary to point out here the 
repercussion of the financial crisis of 1864-1868 and the economic changes 
brought about by the Restoration of the Monarchy after 1876 (see Graphs 1 and 
2). We must especially refer to the patent law of 1878, which introduced a 
system of progressive annual quotas that, in practice, provided an enormous 
savings in patent rights, since only first-year fees were required to make it 
effective. Likewise, the 1883 international agreement on industrial property 
must be mentioned, as it reinforced protection for foreign patents. Thus, from 
that time on, there was a continuous increase in applications and grants, both 
domestic and, even more so, foreign, in response to legal and socio-economic 
improvements and to the general increase of inventions and patents in the 
world. There were critical periods, during the general crisis of the end of the 
nineteenth century or during World War I, but patent growth slowed down 
noticeably in Spain at the end of the 1920s, caused in part by the decline of the 
international economic panorama after the crisis of 1929 and the 1930s reces-
sion, which influenced foreign patentees, but mostly by a sharp domestic dete-
rioration in political and social conditions that led to Franco’s military coup 
and to the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), which entailed a rapid economic 
collapse, while patent series dropped off.5 
Graph 2: Independent and Corporate Patents in Spain by Residence, 1820-1939 
 
Source: See Graph 1. 
                                                             
5  For the strong influence of wars on patent series, see Diebolt and Pellier 2012. 
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In Graph 2 we disaggregate independent and corporate patent data by appli-
cant’s residence. As is demonstrated, Spanish resident independents dominated 
resident firms by and large during the whole period studied, apparently being 
the main source of domestic patent activity and technology transfer. Neverthe-
less, among non-residents the bias was slightly different. Although foreign 
independents also played a key role after 1850, and particularly between the 
decade of 1880 and 1914, foreign companies constantly climbed up the patent 
registry from the middle of the 1890s onwards, and remarkably after World 
War I, when they outnumbered foreign independent patents. Therefore, the data 
confirm, firstly, that individual patenting, both domestic and foreign, deserves 
more attention than we have currently paid to it in order to understand the 
processes of innovation at the European periphery. The actual role of those 
social networks of technicians, businessmen and small entrepreneurs in the 
modernization process, as well as their international connections and agents, 
should be included in the specialized scholars’ research agenda. Secondly, the 
series also corroborates that foreign rather than domestic corporations also 
made a relevant contribution to the process of technological diffusion and 
technology transfer to Spain after 1890, especially in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Although this has been much more deeply considered by historiography, we 
still lack studies as to how that corporate action took place and which patent 
and business strategies were followed, especially within latecomers and under-
developed countries. 
If we focus now exclusively on corporate patenting (Table 2), we are able to 
verify that the presence of Spanish firms was proportionally diminishing from 
approximately 70% before 1880 to just 22.6% between 1920 and 1939, as also 
occurred with French companies taking out patents in Spain. France dominated 
foreign investment in Spanish IPRs until 1900 (20-23%), but dropped quickly 
during the first decades of the 20th century as German, USA, British and even 
Swiss and Dutch corporations occupied its place, corroborating their increasing 
international technological expansion during the second industrial revolution. 
Approximately 50% of all corporate patents in Spain between 1820 and 1939 
were taken out by firms from those five countries (65%, if we add France). 
Notwithstanding, only comparing these figures with those of independent pa-
tents (see Table 3) allows the whole picture to emerge. First, we cannot forget 
that independents registered 2.5 times as many patents as corporations during 
the total period studied. Second, the majority of the patentees were Spanish 
residents (an average of 55%) with an outstanding presence of French residents 
(12.2%). Finally, although there were also independents from the rest of the 
countries considered (i.e. Germany, UK, USA, Switzerland, Netherlands and 
others) they were proportionally less represented than firms (just 23% of inde-
pendent patents from those five countries mentioned). 
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Table 2: Percentage of Corporate patents in Spain by Firm’s Country of 
 Residence, 1820-1939 
FIRMS 
1820-1939 
% 
1820-1879 
% 
1880-1899 
% 
1900-1919 
% 
1920-1939 
% 
Spain 26.5 68.0 40.1 30.6 22.6 
Germany 21.8  3.6 16.1 20.8 23.2 
France 14.5 23.1 20.7 15.2 13.3 
USA 10.7  0.4  5.6  9.5 11.9 
UK 10.0  2.0  6.6 10.3 10.5 
Switzerland  4.8  1.0  2.6  3.4  5.7 
Netherlands  2.8  0.0  0.3  0.6  4.0 
Italy  2.5  1.0  1.4  2.3  2.7 
Belgium  1.7  0.4  3.9  2.2  1.3 
Sweden  1.2  0.0  0.3  1.0  1.3 
Austria  0.8  0.0  0.9  1.2  0.6 
Rest  2.7  0.6  1.4  2.8  2.9 
Total Patents 43,912 506 3,440 11,179 28,787 
Source: See Graph 1. 
Table 3: Percentage of Independent Patents in Spain by Applicant’s Country of 
 Residence, 1820-1939 
INDEPENDENTS 
1820-1939 
% 
1820-1879 
% 
1880-1899 
% 
1900-1919 
% 
1920-1939 
% 
Spain 54.5 61.6 41.1 55.1 59.3 
France 12.2 22.1 16.9 11.2  9.8 
Germany  8.6  1.7  9.7  8.2  9.1 
UK  6.7  7.7 10.6  6.8  4.7 
USA  5.7  3.3 11.1  6.2  3.2 
Italy  2.4  0.8  1.4  2.3  3.2 
Belgium  1.6  1.1  2.0  1.7  1.5 
Switzerland  1.6  0.4  0.8  1.5  2.2 
Austria  1.0  0.3  1.3  0.8  1.2 
Sweden  0.7  0.1  0.7  0.8  0.7 
Netherlands  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.6 
Rest  4.4  0.8  4.1  4.9  4.5 
Total Patents 108,792 5,330 21,093 35,564 46,805 
Source: See Graph 1. 
 
Thus, to sum up, it seems that independents, particularly residents, might have 
played a significant role among latecomers as Spain, economically less-
developed, technologically dependent, with very few firms and corporations, 
but where individual entrepreneurship could have become central to the process 
of innovation and technology transfer from abroad. In this context, geograph-
ical proximity matters more for individuals than for firms. Spanish and French 
technicians and businessmen dominated the system and, although independents 
from Germany, UK, USA and others constantly increased their presence, they 
never outnumbered the former as occurred, on the contrary, with corporate 
patenting. Therefore, independent patenting was more than likely more closely 
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related to real knowledge of the Spanish businesses and market than was the 
case of some corporations that patented abroad as a global strategy. We should 
remember here that among Spanish residents there was also a remarkable per-
centage of qualified labor from other countries, principally France, living in 
and taking out patents within Spain (Sáiz 2002, 55-6). Besides market accessi-
bility, the balance between corporate and independent patents could have de-
pended as well on the degree of development of ‘Chandlerian’ firms, interna-
tionalization competences and financial capitalism in each country. 
Table 4: Ratio of Independent/Corporate patents in Spain by Countries,  
 1820-1939 
 1820-1939 1820-1879 1880-1939 
Indepen. 
% 
Firms 
% 
Indepen. 
% 
Firms 
% 
Indepen. 
% 
Firms 
% 
Netherlands 29.4 70.6 100.0  0.0 29.0 71.0 
Switzerland 45.0 55.0  82.1 17.9 44.7 55.3 
Germany 49.3 50.7  83.2 16.8 49.1 50.9 
USA 57.0 43.0  98.9  1.1 56.3 43.7 
Sweden 60.7 39.3 100.0  0.0 60.6 39.4 
UK 62.3 37.7  97.6  2.4 61.0 39.0 
Norway 66.2 33.8 100.0  0.0 66.1 33.9 
CzechRepublic 66.6 33.4 100.0  0.0 66.5 33.5 
France 67.7 32.3  91.0  9.0 66.0 34.0 
Belgium 70.1 29.9  96.6  3.4 69.4 30.6 
Italy 70.9 29.1  89.4 10.6 70.7 29.3 
Hungary 73.8 26.2 100.0  0.0 73.6 26.4 
Austria 77.3 22.7 100.0  0.0 77.1 22.9 
Denmark 79.9 20.1 100.0  0.0 79.8 20.2 
Canada 81.5 18.5 100.0  0.0 81.4 18.6 
Poland 82.5 17.5  66.7 33.3 82.6 17.4 
Spain 83.6 16.4  90.5  9.5 83.2 16.8 
Rest 86.1 13.9  93.5  6.5 86.0 14.0 
AVERAGE 71.2 28.8  91.3  8.7 70.4 29.6 
Source: See Graph 1. 
 
Table 4 presents the ratio of corporate and independent patents in Spain by 
countries. It clearly demonstrates that there were a few nations in which the 
deep economic, industrial and entrepreneurial transformations experienced 
during the second industrial revolution, between 1880 and 1939, led to widely 
extending the role of multinational corporations in foreign patenting and tech-
nology transfer. This is well-known in the German case, as we expected, but 
perhaps not so much when we examine the Swiss and Dutch examples. As in 
the case of Germany, more than half of the patents applied for in Spain from 
Switzerland were taken out by firms (55%), a ratio that reached 70% in the 
case of the Netherlands, demonstrating the necessity of further studies on 
Dutch corporate expansion and its role in technology transfer. Thus, in these 
three countries, the percentage of independents strongly dropped at the end of 
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the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century as their firms increas-
ingly took over the business of innovation. Another group of three countries 
(the UK, Sweden and the USA) also had a high percentage of firms patenting 
in Spain (from 37 to 43%) although independents always predominated, as 
occurred extensively in the rest of the countries, as demonstrated in Table 4, 
with 33% or fewer corporate patents. Again, the case of the host country, 
Spain, stands out, with the highest rank of independent patents (almost 84%) 
when compared to that of firms. The issue that immediately emerges is whether 
independents were more, less or just as efficient as corporations in facilitating 
innovation and technology transfer to latecomers. 
3.  Social Networks of Innovation in the European 
Periphery 
Thanks to the large body of work carried out over the last decade at the Ar-
chive of the Spanish Patent and Trademark Office, by examining each and 
every administrative and technical patent file, we have been able to extract and 
analyze several qualifying indicators as to the patents’ compulsory implemen-
tation, the grant extension, or the assignments and licenses registered. The 
obligatory working clause was an interesting administrative requisite in Spain. 
Within a 1 to 3-year time frame6 independents and firms were required to 
demonstrate that the patented object was being implemented and manufactured 
within national territory, which was enforced to varying degrees depending on 
the period, always under penalty of expiration of the monopoly and, from 1924 
on, also of a compulsory license to whoever applied.7 Most of the patents did 
never pass this requirement, therefore returning to public domain within 2-4 
years after being granted. Thus, we suppose that the patent’s greater length and 
cost, both monetary and administrative, was a consequence of reasonable ex-
pectation (and materialization) of profit from the technical monopoly, which 
firstly led the owner to face and meet the implementation requirements, and 
                                                             
6  It was one year between 1826 and 1878, two between 1878 and 1902, and three years from 
1902 onwards. 
7  From the beginning of the protection system until 1849, there was hardly any control over 
patent implementation. The Royal Order of the 11th of January of 1849 precipitated an ef-
ficient control from 1849 to 1878, requiring notarized independent reports. Between 1878 
and 1924 the implementation procedure was relaxed, a report, in some cases, by an engi-
neer certifying that the necessary means to produce an object existed at such-and-such a 
factory being sufficient, but nonetheless it still was a difficult requisite to meet. In 1924 the 
Regulation of the 15th of January strengthened the compulsory working clauses under pen-
alty, at first, of a forced obligatory license of the patent to whoever applied, and then, once 
the Law of the 26th of July of 1929 passed, including an expiration date within 3 years if 
nobody took the license. 
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secondly to pay the increasing fees year by year until it was abandoned or until 
the patent ended8. The duration of the monopoly has also been used as a meas-
ure of patent value in other historical works, as in J. Streb, J. Baten and S. Yin 
(2006), where only German patents surviving at least 10 years were worthy of 
attention. 
Table 5: Independent and Corporate Patents in Spain by Implementation and 
 Duration Percentages, 1820-1939 
 Implemented 
% 
Non-
implemented 
% 
Implemented 
Duration  
> 5 y., % 
Implemented 
Duration 
 >10 y., % 
Patents* 
Resident  
independents 17.8 82.2 7.8 2.9  57,379 
Non-resident 
independents 21.0 79.0 10.9 3.9  47,641 
Total independents 19.3 80.7 9.2 3.4 105,020 
Resident firms 31.3 68.7 16.1 5.5  10,811 
Non-resident firms 22.8 77.2 14.1 6.6  29,723 
Total firms 25.1 74.9 14.6 4.9  40,534 
AVERAGE 20.9 79.1 10.7 3.8 145,554* 
*Calculations were made based on 95.3% of patents analyzed. It is not possible to establish 
whether or not the remainder were implemented. 
Source: See Graph 1. 
 
Table 5 demonstrates, first, what we have just pointed out above that is that 
79% of patents taken out throughout the whole period studied never met the 
compulsory working clauses and expired within a few years after the conces-
sion. That means that the majority of technological information created or, 
more usually, transferred from abroad could be freely used in Spain after no 
more than five years. Secondly, that firms were always more effective in put-
ting into practice the protected technologies than independents (25.1 to 19.3% 
respectively), and that the formers’ monopolies obtained a longer extension 
than those granted to individuals when we examine the patent duration above 
both 5 as well as 10 years. Finally, Table 5 demonstrates the extent to which 
patentee’s behaviors change when legal status and place of residence are 
crossed-referenced. Domestic firms were very active and practically doubled 
                                                             
8  We obtained this information from the analysis of the initial and renovation fees met by the 
patentee to maintain exclusive rights, which were paid in advance between 1826 and 1878 
after choosing the expiration date (5, 10 or 15 years) and annually from 1878 onwards for a 
maximum of 20 years. Patents of introduction only lasted a maximum of 5 years although 
they came under the same requirements of compulsory implementation. 
HSR 37 (2012) 4  │  361 
the percentage of effectiveness in patent implementation (31.3%) as well as in 
monopoly duration (16.1% valid after 5 years) compared to the ratios shown by 
resident independents. Likewise, home firms went approximately ten percent-
age points above non-residents (corporate or independent) in exploiting patents, 
although those differences among foreign and resident corporations almost 
disappeared when we contrast the patent extension beyond 5 and 10 years. 
Indeed, foreign firms were the most effective in maintaining the monopoly 
after 10 years (6.6%). Furthermore, the variances between non-resident firms 
and independents in meeting the compulsory practice were minimal (22.8 and 
21%) and they both outnumbered that of resident independents (17.8%), who 
were less effective. 
Table 6: Independent and Corporate Patents in Spain by Percentage of 
 Assignments & Licenses, 1820-1939 
 Assignments & Licenses, % Patents 
Resident independents 3.8 59,326 
Non-resident independents 5.5 49,466 
Total independents 4.5 108,792 
Residentfirms 5.6 11,648 
Non-residentfirms 6.2 32,264 
Total firms 6.1 43,912 
Average 5.0 152,704 
Source: See Graph 1. 
 
Another complementary means of measuring the value and scope of patents is 
the number of assignments and licenses registered, as they could be considered 
an indirect proxy of technical quality of the invention protected, as well as of 
business interest with respect to innovation, especially in a patent system with-
out previous technical exams. Table 6 demonstrates that only a small percent-
age of patents (5% on average) were officially assigned or licensed during the 
entire period studied, which reflects the apparent scarcity of business and the 
narrowness of markets of innovation in Spain. This fits well with the high 
percentage of patents expired within the first three to five years (almost 90%, 
according to Table 5), drawing a picture of free access to most technical infor-
mation in the short-term, whilst a few top-quality patents concentrated most of 
the interest and the business. In these issues, firms stood out slightly, again 
compared to independents (6.1 to 4.5%), particularly non-resident firms, 
among which there could have been more concern in finding domestic partners 
and agreements to sell the rights than in directly exploiting the patent, insofar 
as they were not really interested in making actual investments in the Spanish 
economy. For similar reasons, resident or non-resident independents might 
have been also more interested than firms in commercializing their patent 
rights, although the figures in Table 6 do not demonstrate any particular bias 
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other than that the foreign independents’ ratio of licensing moderately exceed-
ed that of residents (5.5 to 3.8%). 
Thus, on the one hand, our findings would confirm the importance of inde-
pendent innovation and technology transfer on the periphery, as both residents 
and non-resident individuals not only took out the majority of patents between 
1820 and 1939, but also put into practice and exploited a certain percentage not 
radically differing from that of firms. The Spanish data would concretely cor-
roborate and widen the analysis of other scholars when outstanding independ-
ent invention in pioneers and first comers, as is the case of the UK or the US. 
Indeed, we demonstrate that foreign (mainly German, French, USA and Brit-
ish) independents were at least as relevant as foreign corporations in taking out 
and exploiting patents on the periphery throughout the nineteenth and during 
the first forty years of the twentieth century. Moreover, if we attend to other 
qualifying patent data in Spain as the percentage of assignments and licenses or 
the patent time extension, foreign independent bias was close to that of foreign 
firms, suggesting similar effectiveness and technical quality, although firms 
slightly stood out.  
On the other hand, our findings reveal that in latecomers and underdevel-
oped economies, with high rates of technological dependency, domestic firms 
could have played a key role in the processes of technology transfer and inno-
vation, although resident independent patents largely outnumbered those of 
corporations. Further research and case studies are needed, but as is demon-
strated in Tables 5 and 6, resident firms were the most effective group in put-
ting into practice the technologies patented, in maintaining the monopolies (at 
least for 10 years) and they were also quite active in licensing. Likewise, it 
seems that there was more failure among resident independents than in any 
other group and that the differences between resident independents and firms 
with respect to the quality of innovations were more evident than between non-
residents or than what was occurring in pioneering countries, where independ-
ents achieved at least the same technological success as enterprises (Nicholas 
2010, 2011). In reality, the key role of domestic enterprises fits well with their 
greater knowledge of a still imperfect Spanish market and institutions, the lack 
of legal protection, their better access to scarce capital, and the existence of 
high transaction costs in innovation processes, which taken together make 
independents more likely to fail in the long-term. As the contemporary and 
influential article of R. Coase (1937) ‘The Nature of the Firm’ pointed out, 
enterprises beat individuals in diminishing search, information, policing, en-
forcement or keeping-trade-secrets costs. Nowadays we also know that firms 
act as ‘nexus of contracts’, which could increase legal security among the dif-
ferent agents involved, something that might be crucial at the European periph-
ery during the first push towards globalization. 
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Table 7: Distribution of Independent Patents by the Professional Status of the 
 Applicant, 1820-1939 
 1820-1879 1880-1939 
Residents 
% 
Non-
residents 
% 
Total 
% 
Residents 
% 
Non-
residents 
% 
Total 
% 
Civil servants  9.5  5.3  8.2  8.2  4.6  6.8 
Lawyers & attorneys  0.5  0.0  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3 
Military officers  3.3  2.5  3.1  5.0  1.9  3.8 
Engineers & 
technicians  0.2  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.9  0.6 
University, education  2.0  1.3  1.8  0.5  0.4  0.5 
Politicians & high civil 
servants  0.6  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.8  0.6 
Low civil servants  3.0  0.3  2.1  1.5  0.3  1.1 
Professionals & 
Technicians 24.0 46.2 30.9 30.9 63.5 43.6 
Lawyers & managers  3.7  1.4  3.0  3.9  2.6  3.4 
Engineers & scientists 14.9 40.8 22.9 19.9 53.6 33.0 
Physicians & 
pharmacist  3.0  2.9  3.0  4.0  2.2  3.3 
Privateeducation  1.9  0.2  1.3  1.0  2.3  1.5 
Inventors, designers…  0.0  0.3  0.1  0.3  1.7  0.9 
Artists, musicians…  0.3  0.3  0.3  1.0  0.7  0.9 
Other liberal 
professions  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.7  0.6  0.6 
Businessmen & 
Entrepreneurs 63.9 46.3 58.4 52.8 22.8 41.1 
Capitalists & ‘owners’  7.8  5.4  7.0  2.6  1.5  2.2 
Salesmen & traders 13.5 11.3 12.8 10.8  3.0  7.7 
Manufacturers & 
industrialists 19.8 15.4 18.4 31.9 15.7 25.6 
Craftsmen 22.9 14.2 20.2  7.6  2.6  5.7 
Miscellaneous  2.6  2.3  2.5  8.0  9.0  8.4 
Workers & employees  1.3  0.3  1.0  3.1  0.3  2.0 
Students  0.6  0.0  0.4  0.8  0.0  0.5 
Housewifes, retired-
men  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1 
Clergy  0.3  0.3  0.3  1.0  0.4  0.7 
Nobility  0.5  1.5  0.8  1.6  2.5  2.0 
Others  0.0  0.2  0.1  1.3  5.7  3.1 
Patents with 
profession* 2,644 1,189 3,833 16,486 10,521 27,007 
% patents without 
profession 19.5 41.9 28.1 70.6 77.8 73.9 
Total patents 3,283 2,047 5,330 56,043 47,419 103,462 
*Calculations were made based on an average of 28.3% of independent patents between 1820 
and 1939. The rest indicated no profession. Corporate patents are always excluded. 
Source: See Graph 1. 
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However, although there is no doubt that corporations were essential players in 
international technology transfer and an active part of the socials networks of 
innovation, it is necessary to go beyond the boundaries of the firm and careful-
ly scrutinize independents. This is not only based on the evidence that individ-
uals outnumbered firms in taking out patents, but also on the fact that inde-
pendent applications may offer interesting data on the patentees’ socio-
professional belonging and, therefore, on the social framework of innovation 
throughout the period studied. In Table 7 we have distributed resident and non-
resident independent patents in Spain before and after 1880 according to the 
profession or social status mentioned by the patentee himself. From 1820 to 
1879 that data is available in 72% of the patents, whilst between 1880 and 1939 
it is only specified in 26%. Notwithstanding, the sample is representative 
enough to deserve a detailed analysis, in which we have grouped the profes-
sions or status into four main categories: a) civil servants, which includes low-
level clerks, high-level appointments, lawyers, military officers, university 
professors or technicians working in an administrative position; b) liberal pro-
fessionals and qualified technicians, such as lawyers and managers, engineers, 
architects, chemists, physicists and other scientists, physicians and pharmacists, 
inventors and designers, artists, musicians, writers, journalists, photographers 
and other professionals, self-employed or not, but always emphasizing their 
academic title or technical skills; c) businessmen and entrepreneurs, including 
capitalists and ‘owners’ (terms that indicate capacity to have access to capital, 
land and natural resources)9, manufacturers, industrialists, master craftsmen, 
autonomous skilled workers, salesmen and traders; and d) miscellaneous, that 
is, a heterogeneous group including unskilled and semi-qualified laborers, 
students, housewives, retirees, nobility and clergy, and others not easy to clas-
sify, such as simply ‘graduate’. 
The distribution demonstrates that before 1880, i.e. during the beginnings of 
modern economic growth in Spain, the networks of independent innovation and 
technology transfer were mainly developed through businessmen and entrepre-
neurs directly related to production processes (58.4%), followed by qualified 
professionals and technicians (31%). The former were principally craftsmen, 
manufacturers, or traders driven by learning-by-doing/using and incremental 
innovation processes, who applied for patents themselves, mentioning the 
economic activity to which they were devoted and in which they had created or 
introduced novelties. It was unlikely that they possessed scientific or academic 
qualifications, but had significant technical and practical training, a useful and 
reliable knowledge that was the soul and spirit of technical progress in coun-
tries as the UK or the US during the first stages of industrialization (Mokyr 
2002). Our evidence also demonstrates that this social group slinks to the real 
                                                             
9  Among ‘owners’ there are also some farmers. 
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economic world allowed it to take an active part in technology transfer, from 
pioneers to latecomers. This is also the social class inclined towards participat-
ing in, or founding, joint-ventures and future firms, which fits well with the 
increasing role of non-independent innovation in the following phases. On the 
other hand, among the group of qualified professionals, engineers stood out 
prominently (23%) followed, with lesser ratios, by other skilled practitioners, 
such as lawyers or managers. Thus, engineers and scientists were the new 
emerging technical top class that would progressively capture independent 
innovation during the second industrial revolution, as new and complex sci-
ence-based technologies spread. Finally, the presence of civil servants (mainly 
military officers) and other groups was very low (10%). 
This tendency, with the predominance of entrepreneurs and engineers above 
all other groups, is confirmed in the second period analyzed. From 1880 to 
1939, almost 85% of independent patents were still concentrated in the same 
social framework. There has been, however, a significant shift. As we ad-
vanced above, engineers, scientists and, to a lesser degree, other highly-skilled 
technicians, have become the main source of independent innovation and tech-
nology transfer during this stage, outnumbering manufacturers, industrialists, 
craftsmen or traders (43.6 to 41.1%), who, nonetheless, still played a relevant 
role among independents, particularly among residents. Table 7 demonstrates 
that there were significant and determinant differences in these international 
social networks of innovation according to the place of residence. Among non-
residents, the ratio of qualified technicians and engineers was already very high 
between 1820 and 1880, equaling that of independent manufacturers (approxi-
mately 46% each group), and predominated from 1880 to 1939, reaching per-
centages of 63.5% (53.6% engineers) to only 22.8% of industrialists and trad-
ers. Among residents, the presence of qualified technicians also increased in 
the second period, but manufacturers, traders and craftsmen always prevailed 
(63.9% before 1880 and 52.8% after that year). Thus, during the final decades 
of the nineteenth and the first third of the twentieth century the networks of 
innovation expanded, connecting the ongoing scientifically-applied knowledge 
of the second industrial revolution to domestic producers at the periphery 
through links between foreign engineers and technicians and local entrepre-
neurs, industrialists and firms. As some scholars have pointed out, the increas-
ing role of international agents, legal practitioners and intermediaries in the 
markets of technology during the same period was fundamental in this process 
(Guagnini 2002, 2012; Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 2003; Gálvez-Behar 2006). 
Indeed, very recent research on Spanish innovation agency reveals that in the 
1860s, practically half of the patent applications in Spain involved an agent, a 
percentage that exceeded 80% by 1890 (Pretel and Sáiz 2012). 
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4.  Concluding Remarks 
Apparently, corporations had almost monopolized invention and innovation 
activities throughout the second half of the twentieth century, turning into the 
main users of the patent offices all over the world. It is well-known that the 
tipping point between a nineteenth-century innovation system, completely 
dominated by independent inventors, and the present-day incorporated frame-
work took place during the so-called second industrial revolution, from the 
decade of 1880 up until World War II. Thus, from that period onwards, the 
firm and the corporation quickly became the key research topic for most schol-
ars – economists, sociologists or historians – interested in any of the multiple 
facets of technological change. Independent inventors and scientists, previously 
the new heroes of modernity, were suddenly neglected, dropped from the stud-
ies and turned into amateurs without relevancy outside the firm’s boundaries. 
However, and paradoxically, recent analyses demonstrate that in the 1930s, 
half of the patents were still granted to independent applicants in more ad-
vanced North Atlantic economies, and that they were not just stay-at-home 
hobbyist with worthless ideas, but as successful as those within the larger com-
panies. Furthermore, nowadays independents still obtain one third of the pa-
tents in many relevant countries, and in certain cases they continue to produce 
crucial knowledge with a highly valuable economic impact.  
Although the scant research available has shed some light on the outstanding 
historical role of independents in a few advanced countries, such as the US, the 
UK or Japan, we still lack relevant analysis on latecomers and late-developed 
economies on the periphery with high rates of technology transfer and technical 
dependency. By analyzing corporate versus independent patents in Spain in the 
long-term, we have demonstrated that independents also contributed signifi-
cantly to innovation and technological diffusion processes, as they were in-
volved in 90% of the Spanish patents before 1880 and in almost 60% in the 
1930s. That presence was remarkably high in the case of domestic residents, 
among whom independent patents reached five times those granted to firms 
during the entire period studied. Non-resident independents were also very 
active, taking out patents in Spain and they outnumbered foreign firms up until 
the interwar period. During the 1920s, multinational corporations from ad-
vanced countries, particularly from Germany, France, the US, the UK, Switzer-
land and the Netherlands increased their technological expansion towards less 
developed economies, progressively displacing independents belonging to 
these same countries, which was a very noteworthy process in the case of Hol-
land, Switzerland or Germany. Firms were also more effective at putting into 
practice the technologies patented, a compulsory requirement in the Spanish 
system, as well as at maintaining the monopolies time extension. In both cases, 
resident firms were by and large the most effective, demonstrating the im-
portance of local markets and institutional knowledge. 
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The same reasoning could be applied when independents’ professions are 
analyzed. Among residents, the group made up of manufacturers, industrialists, 
craftsmen, businessmen, traders, i.e. people actually connected with production 
processes and ultimately with enterprises, was the most significant during the 
entire period, with more than half of total resident patents. Although master 
craftsmen and small manufacturers without formal schooling or qualifications 
were also common among independents in the British or the USA patent sys-
tems before 1850, they were increasingly substituted by engineers and techni-
cians with scientific training during the second half of the century (Inkster 
2003, 187-92; Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 2005, 18-9 and Figure 2; MacLeod 
2007, 359-65), a process that is also evident in the Spanish patent series after 
1880, when foreign engineers increased their participation, but which we can 
hardly verify among Spanish residents. 
Thus, the emergence of international networks of innovation throughout the 
nineteenth and the first decades of the twentieth century seems to have been 
mainly based in streams of technical information and entrepreneurial initiatives 
shared among engineers and technicians from scientific and technologically 
advanced countries, and businessmen, manufacturers and small-scale industri-
alists from latecomer and less-developed nations. These social networks of 
innovation were progressively linked to complex relationships within the firm 
and the multinational corporation, which would increasingly capture the inter-
national system of innovation and employ researchers. Patent agents were 
essential in the configuration of those networks. Corporate expansion notwith-
standing, our evidence suggests that independent webs not only survived, but 
even played a significant role in technology transfer and catch-up processes at 
the European periphery during the entire twentieth century, a role that has been 
incomprehensively neglected.  
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